On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects
University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business
HEC Paris - Finance Department
FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2001
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, ascending auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation
JEL Classification: C72, D44working papers series
Date posted: October 11, 2001
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