|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple ObjectsGian-Luigi AlbanoUniversity College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.) Fabrizio GermanoUniversitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business Stefano LovoHEC Paris - Finance Department May 2003 FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2001 Abstract: We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21 Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, ascending auctions, FCC auctions, collusion, retaliation JEL Classification: C72, D44 working papers seriesDate posted: October 11, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.390 seconds
