Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
Lee J. Alston
Indiana University - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis; University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Universidade de Brasilia
Gary D. Libecap
University of California, Santa Barbara - Donald Bren School of Environmental Science & Management; University of Arizona - Karl Eller Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
FEEM Working Paper No. 70.2001
We examine land reform policies and their implications for violent conflict over land and resource use in the Brazilian Amazon. We identify the protagonists (land owners and squatters), derive their incentives to use violence, and show the role of legal inconsistencies as a basis for conflict. Although civil law guarantees title for land owners, the Brazilian Constitution adds a beneficial use criterion as a condition for title enforcement. This provision is part of a land reform or redistribution effort and it provides authorization for transfers to squatters. We describe the government agency involved in land reform, INCRA, and show that its intervention critically affects the actions of both squatters and land owners. Further, we point out the resource use effects of land reform policies and associated insecure property rights to land.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
JEL Classification: L2, N5, Q2
Date posted: October 14, 2001
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