The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 575
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Taxation Principle, Common Agency, Adverse Selection
JEL Classification: D82, L51working papers series
Date posted: October 30, 2001
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