Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=288090
 
 

Citations



 


 



Anti-Insurance


Robert D. Cooter


University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Ariel Porat


Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago - Law School


Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, June 2002

Abstract:     
In standard models of contracts, efficient incentives require the promisor to pay damages for non-performance and the promisee to receive no damages. To give efficient incentives to both parties, we propose a novel contract requiring the promisor to pay damages for nonperformance to a third party, not to the promisee. In exchange for the right to damages, the third party pays the promisor and promisee in advance before performance or nonperformance occurs. We call this novel contract "anti-insurance" because it strengthens incentives by magnifying risk, whereas insurance erodes incentives by spreading risk. Anti-insurance is based on the general principle that when several parties jointly create risk, efficient incentives typically require each party to bear the full risk. Without a third party, the most that can be achieved is to divide the risk among the parties. By improving incentives, anti-insurance contracts can create value and benefit everyone as required for a voluntary exchange.

JEL Classification: A1, D0, D8, K0, K10, K12, K13, K42, L0

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: November 14, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Cooter, Robert D. and Porat, Ariel, Anti-Insurance. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, June 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=288090

Contact Information

Robert D. Cooter
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0503 (Phone)
510-642-3767 (Fax)
Ariel Porat (Contact Author)
Tel Aviv University ( email )
Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
972-3-6408283 (Phone)
972-3-6407260 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/?CategoryID=357&ArticleID=388
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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