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How Globalization Improves Governance

Federico Bonaglia
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Development Centre (DEV)

Jorge Braga de Macedo
New University of Lisbon - Faculty of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Maurizio Bussolo
World Bank - Development Prospects Group


October 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2992

Abstract:     
Globalization, governance and economic performance affect each other in very complex mutual relationships. In this Paper, we establish a clear and well-circumscribed hypothesis: 'Is there an effect of globalization on governance?' To test this hypothesis or, even more specifically, to test how openness can affect the quality of domestic institutions, we survey available theoretical explanations of causal relationships between globalization and governance. Microeconomic theory helps us identify trade policy, competition by foreign producers and international investors, and openness-related differences in institution building costs and benefits, as three major transmission mechanisms through which openness affects a country's corruption levels. Examining a large sample of countries covering a 20-year long period, we found robust empirical support for the fact that increases in import openness do indeed cause reductions in corruption, a crucial aspect of governance. The magnitude of the effect is also quite strong. After controlling for many cross-country differences, openness' influence on corruption is close to one third of that exercised by the level of development. Some cautious policy conclusions are derived.

Keywords: Corruption, globalisation, governance, international trade

JEL Classifications: D72, D73, F19, K42

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 25, 2001 ; Last revised: October 25, 2001

Contact Information

Federico Bonaglia (Contact Author)
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) - Development Centre (DEV) ( email )
2 rue Andrea Pascal
75016 Paris France
+33 1 4524 9603 (Phone)
+33 1 4524 7943 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.oecd.org/dev
Jorge Braga de Macedo
New University of Lisbon - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Campus de Campolide
1099-032 Lisboa Portugal
HOME PAGE: http://www.fe.unl.pt/~jbmacedo/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Maurizio Bussolo
World Bank - Development Prospects Group ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/mbussolo
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