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http://ssrn.com/abstract=289099
 
 

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The Disunity of Unanimity


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center


Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 83-94, June 2003
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 01-28

Abstract:     
In the original position meta-bargain among political agents, each can achieve higher expected utility by binding himself to a unanimity rule, rather than risk the chance of being an excluded party in later period-by-period bargains. This argument is illustrated for a three-agent, constant-sum game where there are three reasonable voting rule options: 1) dictatorship rule; 2) majority rule; or 3) unanimity rule. Given concave utility functions, by Jensen's Inequality, each player would prefer the coalition inclusion guaranteed by the unanimity rule as opposed to the possible exclusion inherent in the other two options. However, once transactions costs are considered, a unanimity rule will create situations where all voters might agree in principle to a policy proposition, yet they will fail to reach a unanimous consensus.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

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Date posted: March 28, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Klick, Jonathan, The Disunity of Unanimity. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 83-94, June 2003; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 01-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=289099 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289099

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

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