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Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal Trade


Dalia Marin


Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Monika Schnitzer


University of Munich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

May 1995

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1185

Abstract:     
In the aftermath of the international debt crisis of the 1980s reciprocal trade arrangements experienced a resurgence. This paper examines how countertrade can help highly indebted countries to finance imports if they are not able to use standard credit arrangements. It compares the credit enforcement mechanisms discussed by the sovereign debt literature with those available under countertrade agreements and shows under what conditions countertrade can increase the debt capacity of highly indebted countries. The implications of our model for the design of optimal countertrade contracts are consistent with empirical evidence from a data set of 230 countertrade transactions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: Countertrade, creditworthiness, sovereign debt

JEL Classification: F13, F34, L14

working papers series


Date posted: November 15, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Marin, Dalia and Schnitzer, Monika, Creating Creditworthiness through Reciprocal Trade (May 1995). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1185. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=289487

Contact Information

Dalia Marin (Contact Author)
Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2446 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 6227 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Monika Schnitzer
University of Munich - Department of Economics ( email )
Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 2217 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 2767 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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