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Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate and Debt Ponzi Games Under Uncertainty
Olivier J. Blanchard Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Philippe Weil Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) November 2001 MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 01-41 Abstract: In a dynamically efficienct economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of production economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.
Keywords: Dynamic efficiency, pareto optimality, bubbles, Ponzi games, public debt, riskless rate. JEL Classifications: D51, D52, D60, E44, H60 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: November 17, 2001 ; Last revised: November 26, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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