Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University
PIER Working Paper No. 01-041
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
Keywords: Political Stability, Minority Coalitions, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Bicameralism, Constitutions
JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73
Date posted: November 27, 2001
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