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What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Gary Charness
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics

Uri Gneezy
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business


August 16, 2003


Abstract:     
The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among participants. Yet, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. How will people respond to varying degrees of anonymity and social distance? We consider the effect of one form of social distance, by comparing the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When names were revealed, dictators allocated significantly more. However, this information had little effect on ultimatum game offers; strategic considerations seem to crowd out impulses toward generosity or charity.

Keywords: Altruism, Experiment, Generosity, Names, Social Distance

JEL Classifications: A13, B49, C91, D63, D64

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 03, 2001 ; Last revised: August 22, 2003

Suggested Citation

Charness, Gary and Gneezy, Uri, What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games (August 16, 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=292857 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.292857


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Contact Information

Gary Charness (Contact Author)
University of California, Santa Barbara - Department of Economics ( email )
2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States
805-893-2412 (Phone)
805-893-8830 (Fax)
Uri Gneezy
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-8198 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
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