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Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?


Edward P. Lazear


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

April 1981

NBER Working Paper No. R0160

Abstract:     
This paper offers an explanation of the use of mandatory-retirement clauses in labor contracts. It argues that the date of mandatory retirement is chosen to correspond to the date of voluntary retirement, but the nature of the optimal wage profile results in a discrepancy between spot wage and spot VMP (value of the worker's marginal product). This is because it is preferable to pay workers less than VMP when young and more than VMP when old. By doing so, the "agency" problem is solved, so the contract with mandatory retirement is Pareto efficient. A theory of agency is presented and empirical evidence which supports the hypothesis is provided.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: 82

working papers series


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Date posted: December 6, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Lazear, Edward P., Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? (April 1981). NBER Working Paper No. R0160. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=293234

Contact Information

Edward P. Lazear (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9136 (Phone)
650-723-0498 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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