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The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions


Linda Allen


Baruch College, CUNY - Zicklin School of Business

Julapa Jagtiani


Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Stavros Peristiani


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Anthony Saunders


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

January 2002

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 143
NYU Stern Department of Finance Working Paper No. FIN-01-058

Abstract:     
This paper looks at the role of both commercial and investment banks in providing merger advisory services. In this area, unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with investment banks. In their dual role as lenders and advisors to firms that are the target or the acquirer in a merger, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence supporting the certification effect for target firms. In contrast, conflicts of interest appear to dominate the certification effect when banks are advisors to acquirers.

In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target's own bank certifies the (more informationally opaque) target's value to the acquirer. In contrast, we do not find a certification role for acquirers. There are two possible reasons for these different outcomes. First, it is the target firm, not the acquirer, that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers predominantly use commercial bank advisors to obtain access to bank loans that may be used to finance the merger. Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers. However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the acquirer's advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan commitments. Moreover, the advising bank's recommendations may be distorted by considerations related to credit exposure incurred in both past and future lending activity. The market prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank advisors when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: relationship banking, investment bank advisors, commercial bank advisors, mergers and acquisitions

JEL Classification: G21

working papers series


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Date posted: December 14, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Allen, Linda, Jagtiani, Julapa A., Peristiani, Stavros and Saunders, Anthony , The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions (January 2002). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 143; NYU Stern Department of Finance Working Paper No. FIN-01-058. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=293795 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293795

Contact Information

Linda Allen (Contact Author)
Baruch College, CUNY - Zicklin School of Business ( email )
17 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10010
United States
646-312-3463 (Phone)
646-312-3451 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://stern.nyu.edu/~lallen
Julapa A. Jagtiani
Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )
Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
Stavros Peristiani
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-7829 (Phone)
Anthony Saunders
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
9-190, MEC
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0711 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
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