Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=293906
 
 

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Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System


Louis Kaplow


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Steven Shavell


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

November 2001

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 342

Abstract:     
We examine how moral sanctions and rewards, notably the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and virtue, would be employed to govern individuals' behavior if the objective were to maximize social welfare. In our model, we analyze how the optimal use of guilt and virtue is influenced by the nature of the behavior under consideration, the costs of inculcating moral rules, constraints on the capacity to experience guilt and virtue, the fact that guilt and virtue often must be applied to groups of acts rather than be tailored to every conceivable type of act, and the direct effect of feelings of guilt and virtue on individuals' utility. We also consider a number of ways that the model could be extended, discuss the extent to which our analysis is consistent with the observed use of guilt and virtue, and relate our conclusions to longstanding philosophical debates about morality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

JEL Classification: D11, D62, H00, K00

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Date posted: December 13, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven, Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System (November 2001). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 342. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=293906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293906

Contact Information

Louis Kaplow (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-4101 (Phone)
617-496-4880 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/facdir.php?id=32&show=bibliography
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3668 (Phone)
617-496-2256 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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