Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=294541
 
 

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Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic


Nandini Gupta


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

John C. Ham


University of Southern California - Department of Economics

Jan Svejnar


School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA; CEPR; IZA; CERGE-EI; University of Ljubljana

September 2001

William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series No. 323

Abstract:     
While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine theoretically and empirically the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about factors that may affect sequencing, we develop new theoretical models and adapt existing ones. In doing so we characterize potentially competing government objectives as i) maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; iii) minimizing political costs; iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains and v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing theoretical predictions about the sequencing of privatization. We find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. This suggests that the government sequenced privatization in a way that is consistent with our theories of maximizing revenue and maximizing public goodwill. Our findings are consistent with Glaeser and Scheinkman's (1996) recommendations for increasing efficiency through informational gains. They are inconsistent with the government pursuing the objective of increasing Pareto efficiency through improved resource allocation. They are also inconsistent with the hypothesis that the government minimized political costs. Our results also suggest that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from selection bias since privatized firms are likely to have characteristics that make them more profitable than firms that remain in state ownership.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Privatization, government objectives, sequencing, revenue maximization

JEL Classification: G0, H1, L3, P2

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Date posted: December 21, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Gupta, Nandini and Ham, John C. and Svejnar, Jan, Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic (September 2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series No. 323. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=294541 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.294541

Contact Information

Nandini Gupta (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-3416 (Phone)
812-855-5875 (Fax)
John C. Ham
University of Southern California - Department of Economics ( email )
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
Jan Svejnar
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA ( email )
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
CEPR
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
IZA
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
CERGE-EI
P.O. Box 882
7 Politickych veznu
111 21 Prague 1, Prague
Czech Republic
HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz
University of Ljubljana ( email )
Dunajska 104
Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia
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