Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=295664
 
 

References (37)



 
 

Citations (19)



 


 



Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation


Robert M. Hunt


Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

August 1, 2004

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 01-13/R

Abstract:     
This paper presents a model of sequential innovation in which industry structure is endogenous and a standard of patentability determines the proportion of all inventions that qualify for protection (in U.S. patent law this standard is called nonobviousness; in Europe it is called the inventive step). The rate of innovation initially rises as this standard is raised from very low levels, but eventual falls as the standard is raised to very high levels. Hence there is a unique patentability standard that maximizes the rate of innovation. Surprisingly, this critical standard is more stringent for industries disposed to innovate rapidly. The model suggests a number of important implications for patent policy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Patents, intellectual property, nonobviousness, inventive step

JEL Classification: L1, O31, O34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 11, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Hunt, Robert M., Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation (August 1, 2004). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 01-13/R. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=295664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.295664

Contact Information

Robert M. Hunt (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia ( email )
Ten Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1574
United States
215-574-3806 (Phone)
215-574-7101 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,409
Downloads: 354
Download Rank: 43,014
References:  37
Citations:  19

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.468 seconds