Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=297091
 
 

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Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2002

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 397

Abstract:     
Whenever the use of an asset by one party imposes an externality on another party's use of an asset, entitlements must be allocated. Does an upstream firm have a right to use a river's water or does a downstream firm have a right not to have the water used? And if the downstream firm is to be protected, should the protection come in the form of a property right or a liability rule? This paper focuses on how the allocation of entitlements affects ex ante investments and actions. Even when ex post bargaining is easy, the ex post allocation of entitlements, by affecting the distribution of ex post value, can have significant efficiency effects ex ante. By identifying the ex ante effects of alternative rules, the analysis provides a framework for determining allocations of entitlement that would perform best from the perspective of ex ante efficiency. As far as ex ante effects are concerned, liability rules are not generally superior to property rights. The analysis has implications for a broad range of legal and policy questions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: externalities, property rights, liability rules, ex ante investments, regulation

JEL Classification: D62, K10, K11

working papers series


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Date posted: January 16, 2002 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., Ex Ante Investments and Ex Post Externalities (2002). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 397. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=297091 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.297091

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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