Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=297100
 
 

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Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace


Kimberly A. Moore


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 1325-1358, 2002
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-01

Abstract:     
A game-theoretic analysis of forum shopping reveals how opportunities for strategic choices can influence the behavior of plaintiffs and defendants. If neither party has the opportunity to make strategic choices about participation or forum choices, we should expect no adverse selection or moral hazard problems. By contrast, if only one of the parties can control both the participation and forum selection choices, then we could expect pervasive adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In this paper we build on this simple game-theoretic framework, to analyze Dreyfuss and Ginsburg's (2001) Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters. We suggest that if the parties are faced with a bilateral strategic problem (i.e., if one party has control over one strategic choice and the other party has control over the other strategic choice), the extent of opportunistic behavior by either party, and the resulting deadweight losses, are likely to be minimized. In this respect, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal sensibly minimizes the strategic problems of forum shopping and creates an enforcement scheme which leaves intact the innovation incentives underlying intellectual property rights.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

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Date posted: January 18, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Moore, Kimberly A. and Parisi, Francesco, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace. Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 1325-1358, 2002; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=297100 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.297100

Contact Information

Kimberly A. Moore (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
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