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The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation


Roberta Romano


Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2001

Abstract:     
This article advocates opening up international securities regulation to greater regulatory competition than the scant competition that exists at present. After sketching the contours of an international regime of regulatory competition in securities laws and the reasons why such competition is desirable, the article provides a detailed response to objections that have been raised to a proposal for a competitive securities regime that was principally focused on the United States, objections that would accordingly also be raised against this article's proposal. These include whether the U.S. securities regime is directed at mitigating problems regarding disclosure of interfirm externalities, and whether international competition will result in a regulatory race to the lowest level of disclosure. Because the analysis in support of regulatory competition in securities law draws upon the learning regarding competition across U.S. states over the production of corporate law, which has been successful in creating a regime that, on balance, benefits shareholders, the article concludes by indicating that recent critiques of the efficacy of state charter competition are unfounded.

Keywords: Securities regulation, regulatory competition

JEL Classification: K22, G18

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: February 18, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Romano, Roberta, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=297280

Contact Information

Roberta Romano (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4965 (Phone)
203-432-4871 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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