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The Guarantees of FreedomRafael La PortaDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Florencio Lopez de SilanesEDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute Cristian Pop-ElechesColumbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) Andrei ShleiferHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) January 2002 Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1943 Abstract: Hayek (1960) distinguishes the institutions of English freedom, which guarantee the independence of judges from political interference in the administration of justice, from those of American freedom, which allow judges to restrain law-making powers of the sovereign through constitutional review. We create a data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these institutions of English and American freedom, and ask whether these rules predict economic and political freedom in a cross-section of countries. We find that the English institutions of judicial independence are strong predictors of economic freedom and weaker predictors of political freedom. The American institutions of checks and balances are strong predictors of political but not of economic freedom. Judicial independence explains half of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 55 JEL Classification: K00, N40, P10 working papers seriesDate posted: January 23, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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