Endogenous Lobbying Position in Intra-industry Trade

Qiu, Larry

doi:10.2139/ssrn.298307

Abstract

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Endogenous Lobbying Position in Intra-industry Trade

Larry D. Qiu

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics

November 2001

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Abstract:
A two-country, two-firm model has been developed to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trader position. The model predicts that taking the free-trader (protectionist) lobbying position is an efficient (inefficient) firm's dominant strategy. In addition, for any lobbying position taken by a firm, its lobbying effort always decreases as its production cost increases. The findings help shed light on some empirical observations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: Lobbying, Endogenous position, Intra-industry trade, Protectionist, Free trader

JEL Classification: F12, F13

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Date posted: January 30, 2002

Suggested Citation

Qiu, Larry D., Endogenous Lobbying Position in Intra-industry Trade (November 2001). Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=298307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.298307

Contact Information

Larry Dongxiao Qiu (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Economics ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon, Hong Kong
China

HOME PAGE: http://www.bm.ust.hk/~larryqiu/