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Willpower and Personal Rules

Roland Benabou
Princeton University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Jean Tirole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


January 2002

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3143

Abstract:     
This Paper studies the internal commitment mechanisms or 'personal rules' (diets, exercise regimens, resolutions, moral or religious precepts, etc.) through which people seek to achieve self-control. Our theory is based on the idea of self-reputation over one's willpower, which potentially transforms lapses in a personal rule into precedents that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for such effects, in turn, is the imperfect recall of past motives and feelings, which leads people to draw inferences from their own past actions. We thus model the behaviour of individuals who are unsure of their willpower (ability to delay ratification) in certain states of the world, and show how self-control can be sustained by the fear of creating damaging precedents. We also show, however, that people will sometimes adopt excessively rigid rules that result in compulsive behaviours such as miserliness, workaholism, or anorexia. These represent costly forms of self-signaling where the individual is so afraid of appearing weak to himself that every decision becomes a test of his willpower, even when self-restraint is not even desirable ex-ante. Such common behaviours which appear to display a 'salience of the future' are thus not only consistent, but actually generated by (a concern over) present-oriented preferences. Finally, we analyse the cognitive underpinnings of self-regulation. We first show how equilibrium behaviour is shaped by the extent to which the individual's self-monitoring is subject to opportunistic distortions of memory or attribution. We then study how recall and inference processes can themselves be endogenously determined through the use of self-sustaining cognitive rules and resolutions.

Keywords: Self-control, willpower, motivation, memory, time inconsistency, psychology

JEL Classifications: A12, C70, D60, D91, E21, J22, J24

Working Paper Series

Date posted: January 29, 2002 ; Last revised: February 05, 2002

Contact Information

Roland Benabou (Contact Author)
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Robertson Hall, 440
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-3672 (Phone)
609-258-5533 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
212-998-8939 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
D-53072 Bonn Germany
Jean Tirole
University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )
Place Anatole France
21 Allees de Brienne
F-31042 Toulouse Cedex France
+33 5 61 12 8642 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)
University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
31000 Toulouse France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
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