The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures
American University - Kogod School of Business
Raghavan J. Iyengar
North Carolina Central University - School of Business
Syracuse University - School of Management
Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming in the Summer Issue of 2002
This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income-decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from non-routine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two-task principal-agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.
JEL Classification: J33, G34, M41, F23Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 18, 2002
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