Abstract

References (40)

Beta

Citations (31)

Beta

One-Click Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase

Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists

Colin Camerer
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Ernst Fehr
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich

January 2002

IEER Working Paper No. 97

Abstract:
Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game
theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary explanations and of social preference theory in organizing the data in a coherent way.

JEL Classifications: C91, M40, M46

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 01, 2002 ; Last revised: January 07, 2006

Suggested Citation

Camerer, Colin F. and Fehr, Ernst, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists (January 2002). IEER Working Paper No. 97. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=299143 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.299143

Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Ernst Fehr (Contact Author) Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (IEW), University of Zurich ( email ) Bluemlisalpstrasse 10 CH-8006 Zurich 8006 Switzerland +41 1 634 3709 (Phone) +41 1 634 4907 (Fax)
Colin F. Camerer California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email ) 1200 East California Blvd. Pasadena, CA 91125 United States 626-395-4054 (Phone) 626-432-1726 (Fax)