Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=299250
 
 

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Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers


Stefan Voigt


University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Eli Salzberger


University of Haifa - Faculty of Law


Kyklos, Vol. 55, April 2002

Abstract:     
Elected politicians often choose to delegate competence to various agencies rather than deciding themselves. The paper deals with the apparent paradox that competence is being transferred despite the fact that politicians are assumed to maximize individual utility. The constitutional structure, which is assumed to be exogenously given, serves as the independent variable in deriving hypotheses concerning delegation behavior as the dependent variable. Two categories of delegation can be distinguished: domestic delegation - to agencies within the legislators' jurisdiction - and international delegation - to supranational or international bodies. The choice of the body to which decision-making powers are transferred has rarely been analyzed within a unified framework. The paper deals with this issue.

Keywords: Delegation of Powers, Separation of Powers, Positive Constitutional Economics, agencies, international organizations

JEL Classification: H11, K00, P51

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 27, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan and Salzberger, Eli, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers. Kyklos, Vol. 55, April 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=299250

Contact Information

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )
Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Eli M. Salzberger
University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )
Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel
972-4-8240005 (Phone)
972-4-8240681 (Fax)
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