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An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements
Gilles Chemla Imperial College London - Tanaka Business School; National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) Alexander Ljungqvist New York University - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Michel A. Habib University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute July 2004 NYU, Ctr for Law and Business Research Paper No. 02-01; RICAFE Working Paper No. 006 Abstract: Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held firms, such as joint ventures or venture capital-backed firms. We provide an explanation for the use of put and call options, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, piggy-back rights, and catch-up clauses in shareholder agreements. We view these clauses as serving (1) to induce the parties to make ex ante investments, (2) to preclude ex post transfers by the party that has the ability to engage in such transfers, and (3) to achieve the efficient ex post allocation of stakes in the firm.
Keywords: Shareholder Agreements, Put Options, Call Options, Pre-emption Rights, Catch-up Clauses, Drag-along Rights, Demand Rights, Tag-along Rights JEL Classifications: G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: February 10, 2002 ; Last revised: September 02, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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