The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue
Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University; Criterion Economics, L.L.C.
William J. Baumol
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies; Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics
Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 12, pp. 177-186, 1995
In this piece, we respond to comments on our earlier essay on access pricing in telecommunications on the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR) that appeared in the Winter, 1994 issue of the Yale Journal on Regulation. We are in essential agreement with the comments of Professor Alfred Kahn and Dr. William Taylor, and we are unconvinced by Dr. William Tye's criticisms of the ECPR. We also comment on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords, which embraced the ECPR as a principle consistent with New Zealand antitrust law. We conclude with some remarks about the likelihood that other courts and regulators, particularly those in the United States, will adopt the ECPR.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
JEL Classification: D42, K0, K21, K23, L4, L5, L12, L51, L96Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: March 11, 2002
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