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The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue


Gregory Sidak


Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University; Criterion Economics, L.L.C.

William J. Baumol


New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies; Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics


Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 12, pp. 177-186, 1995

Abstract:     
In this piece, we respond to comments on our earlier essay on access pricing in telecommunications on the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR) that appeared in the Winter, 1994 issue of the Yale Journal on Regulation. We are in essential agreement with the comments of Professor Alfred Kahn and Dr. William Taylor, and we are unconvinced by Dr. William Tye's criticisms of the ECPR. We also comment on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the House of Lords, which embraced the ECPR as a principle consistent with New Zealand antitrust law. We conclude with some remarks about the likelihood that other courts and regulators, particularly those in the United States, will adopt the ECPR.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

JEL Classification: D42, K0, K21, K23, L4, L5, L12, L51, L96

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Date posted: March 11, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Sidak, Gregory Gregory and Baumol, William J., The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue. Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 12, pp. 177-186, 1995. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=299701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.299701

Contact Information

J. Gregory Sidak (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University ( email )
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )
1614 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com
William J. Baumol
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies ( email )
New York, NY
United States
212-998-8943 (Phone)
212-995-3932 (Fax)
Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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