Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=300443
 
 

Citations (21)



 


 



An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives


Pascal Courty


University of Victoria; European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gerald Marschke


University at Albany - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Harvard Law School, Labor & Worklife Program

January 2002

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3164

Abstract:     
This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behaviour diverts resources (eg agents' time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behaviour we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Performance incentives, contract theory, moral hazard, multi tasking, government incentives

JEL Classification: J33, L14

working papers series





Date posted: February 12, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Courty, Pascal and Marschke, Gerald, An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives (January 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3164. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=300443

Contact Information

Pascal Courty (Contact Author)
University of Victoria ( email )
3800 Finnerty Rd
Saanich, British Columbia V8N 1M5
Canada
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy
+39 055 4685 925 (Phone)
+39 055 4685 902 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gerald R. Marschke
University at Albany - Department of Economics ( email )
BA 110
1400 Washington Ave.
Albany, NY 12222
United States
518-437-3755 (Phone)
518-442-5298 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-588-0301 (Phone)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Harvard Law School, Labor & Worklife Program ( email )
125 Mt. Auburn St., 3rd Floor
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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