Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=300681
 
 

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Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model


Norbert Schulz


University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics


Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 158, No. 4, pp. 594-613, December 2002
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-03

Abstract:     
This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. To this end, we differentiate between different forms of property fragmentation. With the use of several functionally related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized as building blocks for the development of a general model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Specifically, our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increase monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we explore some of the important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: February 14, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Schulz, Norbert and Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben, Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 158, No. 4, pp. 594-613, December 2002; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=300681 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.300681

Contact Information

Norbert Schulz (Contact Author)
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )
Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Ben Depoorter
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics ( email )
Ghent Univ. Law School
Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, 9000
Belgium
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