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http://ssrn.com/abstract=301261
 
 

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Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe


Albert Breton


University of Toronto - Department of Economics

Heinrich W. Ursprung


University of Konstanz; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

January 2002

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 657

Abstract:     
The traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation will give rise to predatory competition between the governments of the European nation states. The consequence is anticipated to be a marked reduction in, if not the destruction of, the benevolent Welfare State. The objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led us to believe that, this traditional literature notwithstanding, a European constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal and vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in defining the relationship among member states and also the relationship between the member states and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we know about competition in the commercial sphere.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

JEL Classification: D72, H73

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Date posted: February 28, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Breton, Albert and Ursprung, Heinrich W., Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe (January 2002). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 657. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=301261

Contact Information

Albert Breton
University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )
150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada
416-978-4354 (Phone)
416-978-6713 (Fax)
Heinrich Ursprung (Contact Author)
University of Konstanz ( email )
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany
+49 7531 88 3713 (Phone)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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