Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=301311
 
 

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Allocation of Decision-Making Authority


Milton Harris


University of Chicago - Finance

Artur Raviv


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

March 11, 2005

Twelfth Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference; EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper

Abstract:     
We present a simple model to analyze the allocation of decision-making authority and use the model to characterize the conditions under which a superior will delegate the decision to her subordinate. The model includes two managers, each of whom has private information regarding the outcome of a decision. Because the preferences of the two managers differ, neither can communicate her information fully to the other. We show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of the subordinate's information and decreases with the importance of the superior's information. We also show that, even if the agent is biased toward larger investments, under certain conditions, the average investment will be smaller when the decision is delegated. These results help explain some findings in the empirical literature. Finally, we show the somewhat counterintuitive result that, in some circumstances, increases in agency problems result in increased willingness of the superior to delegate the decision. A number of empirical implications are developed.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Delegation, Authority, Private Information, Communication

JEL Classification: D21, D82, G31

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Date posted: February 26, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur, Allocation of Decision-Making Authority (March 11, 2005). Twelfth Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference; EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=301311 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.301311

Contact Information

Milton Harris (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Finance ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-2549 (Phone)
(773) 753-8310 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/milton.harris/

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Artur Raviv
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8342 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)
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