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Identifying the Effect of Managerial Control on Firm PerformanceRenee B. AdamsUniversity of New South Wales; Financial Research Network (FIRN); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) João A. C. SantosFederal Reserve Bank of New York July 16, 2004 EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper Abstract: We attempt to identify the consequence of the separation of inside ownership from control for firm performance. Exploiting the fact that banking institutions may hold their own shares in trust, we construct a clean measure of the wedge between inside voting control and cash flow rights. These shares provide managers with no monetary incentives, since the cash flows accrue to trust beneficiaries. However, managers may have the authority to vote these shares. Using a unique sample of data, we identify a pure effect of managerial voting control on firm performance. Contrary to the belief that managerial control is purely detrimental, we find that it has positive effects.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45 Keywords: Managerial control, Voting rights, Performance measurement, Trust investments JEL Classification: G32, G30, G21 working papers seriesDate posted: March 9, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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