SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (26)

Beta

 
 

Citations (8)

Beta

 


 



Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets: Island vs Nasdaq

Bruno Biais
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Christophe Bisiere
Universite de Toulouse - (IDEI - CRG)

Chester S. Spatt
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business


November 26, 2003

14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference Paper; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper

Abstract:     
The Internet technology reduces the cost of transmitting and exchanging information. ECNs exploit this opportunity to enable investors to place quotes at very little cost and compete with incumbent stock exchanges. Does this quasi-free entry situation lead to competitive liquidity supply? We analyze trades and order book dynamics on Nasdaq and Island. The Nasdaq touch is frequently undercut by Island limit orders, using the finer tick size prevailing on that ECN. Before decimalization, the coarse tick size constrained Nasdaq spreads, and undercutting Island limit order traders earned oligopoly rents. After decimalization, the hypothesis that liquidity suppliers do not earn rents cannot be rejected.

Keywords: financial markets, liquidity supply, ECN, Island, NASDAQ

JEL Classifications: G10, G23

Working Paper Series

Date posted: November 23, 2003 ; Last revised: August 25, 2004

Suggested Citation

Biais, Bruno, Bisiere, Christophe and Spatt, Chester S., Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets: Island vs Nasdaq (November 26, 2003). 14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference Paper; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=302398 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.302398


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Christophe Bisiere (Contact Author)
Universite de Toulouse - (IDEI - CRG) ( email )
Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
F-31000 Toulouse Cedex France
Bruno Biais
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
Chester S. Spatt
Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-8834 (Phone)
412-268-8896 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,366
Downloads: 1,090
Download Rank: 4,515
References: 26
Citations: 8

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo6 in 0.171 seconds.