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http://ssrn.com/abstract=303285
 
 

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Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance


Heitor Almeida


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel Ferreira


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

March 5, 2002


Abstract:     
Sah (1991) conjectured that more centralized societies should have more volatile performances than less centralized ones. We show in this paper that this is true both for cross-country and within-country variability in growth rates. It is also true for some measures of policies. Finally, we show that both the best and worst performers in terms of growth rates are more likely to be autocracies. These empirical results are unaffected by many robustness and specification checks. We argue that the evidence in the paper is consistent with the theoretical implications in Sah and Stiglitz (1991) and Rodrik (1999). The greater stability of growth rates and policy measures among democratic countries adds to an existing list of desirable features of democracies. Our evidence also corroborates the common view that some autocratic countries had the most impressive growth experiences. However, since the worst experiences are also associated with autocratic countries, in an ex-ante sense autocracy is no prescription for growth.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Democracy, autocracy, growth, variability, fallibility, centralization of decision-making

JEL Classification: P16, P51, O40, O50, H11

working papers series


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Date posted: March 18, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Almeida, Heitor and Ferreira, Daniel, Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (March 5, 2002). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=303285 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.303285

Contact Information

Heitor Almeida (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
515 East Gregory Drive
4037 BIF
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-3332704 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.business.illinois.edu/FacultyProfile/faculty_profile.aspx?ID=11357
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Daniel Ferreira
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Finance ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(+44) 20 7955 7544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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