Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=304206
 
 

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Legislators v. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

Bruno E. Viani


Nathan Associates; CENTRUM-Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

February 2002

AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 02-1

Abstract:     
The recent Federal Communications Commission rule making for low power FM radio has been widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked the Commission for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of consumers, Congress and the Commission can be directly compared. While differences in policy preferences of Congress and the regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they appear extremely modest when compared to the open entry (welfare maximizing) policy alternative. A financial event study reveals that incumbent broadcast station equity values were neither threatened by the Commission's low power FM rules, nor materially enhanced by their reversal in Congress. This lends empirical support to the Congressional Dominance view of regulation, and illustrates the margins on which blame - and credit - shifting strategies are utilized by policy makers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

JEL Classification: H1, H8, L5, N4

working papers series


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Date posted: March 26, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Viani, Bruno E., Legislators v. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio (February 2002). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 02-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=304206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304206

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

Bruno E. Viani
Nathan Associates ( email )
2101 wilson Blvd
ste 1200
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
CENTRUM-Pontifical Catholic University of Peru ( email )
Alomía Robles 125
Lima, Lima 33
Peru
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