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Courts: The Lex Mundi Project


Simeon Djankov


Ministry of Finance; World Bank

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


EDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

March 2002

Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-18; Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1951

Abstract:     
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

JEL Classification: K10, K40, K41, K42, O10

working papers series


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Date posted: March 19, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (March 2002). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-18; Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1951. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=304453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.304453

Contact Information

Simeon Djankov
Ministry of Finance ( email )
Rakovski Avenue 102
Sofia, 1040
Bulgaria
World Bank ( email )
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4748 (Phone)
202-473-5758 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.doingbusiness.org
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
EDHEC Business School ( email )
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
Nice, 06202
France
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07 (Phone)
+33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tinbergen Institute ( email )
Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  37
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