|
||||
|
||||
Courts: The Lex Mundi ProjectSimeon DjankovMinistry of Finance; World Bank Rafael La PortaDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Florencio Lopez de SilanesEDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute Andrei ShleiferHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) March 2002 Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-18; Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1951 Abstract: In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 68 JEL Classification: K10, K40, K41, K42, O10 working papers seriesDate posted: March 19, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.328 seconds