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The Political Economy of Finance
Marco Pagano University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Paolo F. Volpin London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) February 2002 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3231 Abstract: The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to persist over time. A recent strand of research has shown that some progress on these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this Paper we offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking and securities markets. development, privatization
Keywords: Political economy, shareholder protection, corporate governance, bankruptcy law, credit market regulation, financial JEL Classifications: G28, G38, K22, K42 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: March 21, 2002 ; Last revised: June 14, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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