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A Structural Model of Government Formation

Daniel Diermeier

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

December 2001

PIER Working Paper No. 02-001

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Political Stability, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Comparative Constitutional Design

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

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Date posted: April 14, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio, A Structural Model of Government Formation (December 2001). PIER Working Paper No. 02-001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=305881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305881

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Hulya Eraslan
Rice University ( email )
Department of Economics MS-22
Rice University P.O Box 1892
Houston, TX Texas 77251-1892
United States
7133483453 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://he6.web.rice.edu/
Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa
Rice University ( email )
6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
Feedback to SSRN

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References:  41
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