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Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria
George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Larry Samuelson Yale University February 2002 PIER Working Paper No. 02-004 Abstract: We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a game achieved by perturbing payoffs by at most e/2, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.
Keywords: Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium JEL Classifications: C70, C72, C73 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 14, 2002 ; Last revised: April 15, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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