Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
Steven N. Kaplan
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Swedish House of Finance
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3243
We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. We interpret these results in relation to financial contracting theories.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 54
Keywords: Investment banking, venture capital, financing policy, capital and ownership structure, brokerage
JEL Classification: G24, G32working papers series
Date posted: April 4, 2002
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