Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=308543
 
 

References (23)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments


Matthias Kräkel


University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Dirk Sliwka


University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

August 1, 2002

GEABA Working Paper No. 02-08

Abstract:     
A tournament is examined in which two agents with different abilities choose efforts as well as risks. According to the previous literature, the more (less) able agent should choose a low (high) risk strategy, because the first one does not want to imperil his favorable position, whereas the last one can only gain by increasing risk. We show that this is not necessarily true. Risk taking affects equilibrium efforts as well as winning probabilities. Depending on both effects diverse equilibria are possible. For example, the low and the high ability agent may both choose high risks or both choose low risks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: effort effect, likelihood effect, risk taking, tournament

JEL Classification: D23, J3, M12

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: May 5, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Kräkel, Matthias and Sliwka, Dirk, Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments (August 1, 2002). GEABA Working Paper No. 02-08. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=308543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.308543

Contact Information

Matthias Kräkel (Contact Author)
University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )
Adenauerallee 24-42
BWLII
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
+49 228 73 92 11 (Phone)
+49 228 73 92 10 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Dirk Sliwka
University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )
Koln, 50923
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 742
Downloads: 155
Download Rank: 111,909
References:  23
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.250 seconds