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How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions


Paul Klemperer


University of Oxford - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


European Economic Review, 2002

Abstract:     
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Keywords: Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding

JEL Classification: D44, L96

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: May 15, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Klemperer, Paul, How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions. European Economic Review, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311263

Contact Information

Paul Klemperer (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )
Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
+44 1865 278 588 (Phone)
+44 1865 278 557 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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