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Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers


Alon Klement


Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law


The Review of Litigation, Vol. 21, P. 25, 2002

Abstract:     
Class actions have come to play a significant role in American legal system. Law enforcement is no longer left to the state alone, as private pursuit of self interest is harnessed to promote the common good. But private law enforcement has also had its down sides. Lawyers' gain has often come at the price of class members' loss, and misalignment of interests has many times resulted in less compensation and deterrence and more private attorney profits than desired. The question therefore has been how to guarantee that lawyers pursue their self interest yet leave society at large and class members in particular as well off as possible. This paper analyzes the different monitoring schemes that have been unsuccessfully applied in class actions, namely, monitoring by courts and by class members. Building on this analysis it then proposes a workable alternative: private monitoring by self interested individuals and organizations, not necessarily class members, who would compete and pay to obtain the monitoring position, and would receive a share of the class recovery in return.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: class action, litigation, settlement, monitoring, attorney fee, auction

JEL Classification: K13, K42

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: May 28, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Klement, Alon, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers. The Review of Litigation, Vol. 21, P. 25, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311339 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.311339

Contact Information

Alon Klement (Contact Author)
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
97 29 952 7382 (Phone)
97 29 956 8605 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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