Abstract

 


 



A Multilevel Analysis on the Determinants of Regional Health Care Expenditure


Guillem López Casasnovas


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB)

Marc Saez


Universitat de Girona


UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 572

Abstract:     
We apply a multilevel hierarchical model to explore whether an aggregation fallacy exists in estimating the income elasticity of health expenditure by ignoring the regional composition of national health expenditure figures. We use data for 110 regions in eight OECD countries in 1997: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. In doing this we have tried to identify two sources of random variation: within countries and between-countries. Our results show that: 1- Variability between countries amounts to (SD) 0.5433, and just 13% of that can be attributed to income elasticity and the remaining 87% to autonomous health expenditure; 2- Within countries, variability amounts to (SD) 1.0249; and 3- The intra-class correlation is 0.5300. We conclude that we have to take into account the degree of fiscal decentralisation within countries in estimating income elasticity of health expenditure. Two reasons lie behind this: a) where there is decentralisation to the regions, policies aimed at emulating diversity tend to increase national health care expenditure; and b) without fiscal decentralisation, central monitoring of finance tends to reduce regional diversity and therefore decrease national health expenditure.

Keywords: OECD health expenditure, fiscal federalism, multilevel hierarchical models

JEL Classification: I18, H51, E62, C51

working papers series


Date posted: September 23, 2002  

Suggested Citation

López Casasnovas, Guillem and Saez, Marc, A Multilevel Analysis on the Determinants of Regional Health Care Expenditure. UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 572. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311504

Contact Information

Guillem López Casasnovas (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34-3) 542 16 61 (Phone)
(34-3) 542 17 46 (Fax)
Marc Saez
Universitat de Girona ( email )
Campus de Montilivi
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain
+343 972 418736 (Phone)
+34 972 418032 (Fax)
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