Abstract

 
 

References (16)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Economic Rationality and Ethical Behavior


Marc Le Menestrel


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

November 2001

UPF Economics & Business Working Paper No. 584

Abstract:     
This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannot be reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulas like 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethical dilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we propose a model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethical nor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However, behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethical but not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combining ethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn an optimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice. Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethical business remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actually sacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest in demonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by a transparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remain confidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. This discursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helps to further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Rationality, business ethics, economic rationality, transparency, confidentiality

JEL Classification: A13, M14

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 29, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Le Menestrel, Marc, Economic Rationality and Ethical Behavior (November 2001). UPF Economics & Business Working Paper No. 584. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311523 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.311523

Contact Information

Marc Le Menestrel (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
34 93 542 27 23 (Phone)
34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,647
Downloads: 366
Download Rank: 38,035
References:  16
Citations:  2

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 1.016 seconds