The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Pre-Ratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?
John K. Setear
University of Virginia - School of Law
UVA Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-5; and UVA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 02-4
A President who chooses to seek legislative approval of a treaty risks delay, textual modification, and even outright defeat. Neither the Constitution nor Congress nor the courts constrains this choice. The President nonetheless often seeks legislative approval before ratifying a treaty, whether through the constitutionally specified process of obtaining Senate advice-and-consent or the extra-constitutional Congressional-Executive agreement. Why? This Article argues that the President risks the hazards of seeking legislative approval in order to send to other nations a costly, credible signal of US commitment to the obligations of the treaty. First, the Article examines in general terms the choice to seek legislative approval at all and, if sought, which path of legislative approval to employ. Second, the Article argues that the signaling theory explains why Presidents systematically allocate certain issue areas (e.g., trade liberalization or arms control) to certain pre-ratification pathways (e.g., the Congressional-Executive agreement or the Article II pathway, respectively).
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 16, 2002
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.578 seconds