Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=311867
 


 



The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Pre-Ratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?


John K. Setear


University of Virginia - School of Law

May 2002

UVA Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-5; and UVA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 02-4

Abstract:     
A President who chooses to seek legislative approval of a treaty risks delay, textual modification, and even outright defeat. Neither the Constitution nor Congress nor the courts constrains this choice. The President nonetheless often seeks legislative approval before ratifying a treaty, whether through the constitutionally specified process of obtaining Senate advice-and-consent or the extra-constitutional Congressional-Executive agreement. Why? This Article argues that the President risks the hazards of seeking legislative approval in order to send to other nations a costly, credible signal of US commitment to the obligations of the treaty. First, the Article examines in general terms the choice to seek legislative approval at all and, if sought, which path of legislative approval to employ. Second, the Article argues that the signaling theory explains why Presidents systematically allocate certain issue areas (e.g., trade liberalization or arms control) to certain pre-ratification pathways (e.g., the Congressional-Executive agreement or the Article II pathway, respectively).

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: May 16, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Setear, John K., The President's Rational Choice of a Treaty's Pre-Ratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement? (May 2002). Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=311867

Contact Information

John K. Setear (Contact Author)
University of Virginia - School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7354 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

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