Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=312149
 
 

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Bicameralism and Government Formation


Daniel Diermeier


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Hulya Eraslan


Johns Hopkins University

Antonio Merlo


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

May 2004

FEEM Working Paper No. 81.04; PIER Working Paper No. 02-010

Abstract:     
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main findings are that eliminating bicameralism does not affect government durability, but does have a significant effect on the composition of governments leading to smaller coalitions. These results are due to an equilibrium replacement effect: removing bicameralism affects the relative durability of coalitions of different sizes which in turn induces changes in the coalitions that are chosen in equilibrium.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Political Stability, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Bicameralism, Comparative Constitutional Design

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

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Date posted: July 15, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio, Bicameralism and Government Formation (May 2004). FEEM Working Paper No. 81.04; PIER Working Paper No. 02-010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=312149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.312149

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Hulya Eraslan
Johns Hopkins University ( email )
3400 Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States
Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa
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