Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=312195
 
 

References (10)



 
 

Citations (9)



 


 



Consumers and Agency Problems


Canice Prendergast


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. C34-C51, March 2002

Abstract:     
Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers disagree with principals over desired outcomes, which characterises many public sector benefits, consumers' feedback about the performance of agents can reduce welfare. This may result in efficiently restricting the ability of consumers to complain about agent performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: May 15, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Prendergast, Canice, Consumers and Agency Problems. Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. C34-C51, March 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=312195

Contact Information

Canice Prendergast (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7309 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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References:  10
Citations:  9

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