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A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill RequirementsJames AlbrechtGeorgetown University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Susan VromanGeorgetown University; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) International Economic Review, Vol. 43, pp. 283-305, 2002 Abstract: We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High-skill jobs produce more output than low-skill jobs, but high-skill jobs require high-skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: May 16, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
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