Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=313180
 
 

References (36)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation


Vincy Fon


George Washington University - Department of Economics

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 159, No. 1, pp. 76-92, March 2003
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-13

Abstract:     
The concept of reciprocity gains importance where there is no external authority to enforce agreements. Many legal systems foster meta-rules of reciprocity to facilitate cooperative outcomes. This paper considers the role of reciprocity rules in various strategic environments. We start by considering the effect of reciprocity constraints in a classic prisoner's dilemma with two symmetric parties and linear payoffs. We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to a) asymmetric players, and (b) non-linear payoff functions. Then we examine the welfare properties of the reciprocity-induced equilibrium. In many game-theoretic situations, reciprocity facilitates the achievement of cooperative outcomes. Yet the reciprocity-induced equilibrium is not always socially optimal.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Reciprocity, Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation

JEL Classification: C7, K10

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 25, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Fon, Vincy and Parisi, Francesco, Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 159, No. 1, pp. 76-92, March 2003; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=313180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.313180

Contact Information

Vincy Fon
George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )
2115 G Street, N.W.
Monroe Hall, #366
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7580 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,084
Downloads: 1,320
Download Rank: 7,375
References:  36
Citations:  8

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.234 seconds