|
||||
|
||||
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry, and EfficiencyTalbot PageBrown University - Department of Economics Louis PuttermanBrown University - Department of Economics Bulent UnelLouisiana State University, Baton Rouge May 2002 Brown U, Economics Working Paper No. 02-19 Abstract: We study the incentive effects of endogenous group formation in a voluntary contribution experiment. Subjects are given information on the past contributions of others and allowed to express a preference for partners. On the basis of the stated preferences, new groups are formed. We find that the opportunity to form new groups increases both contributions and efficiency. We also compare the regrouping mechanism with a mechanism allowing targeted reductions of others' earnings ("punishment"). In the experiment, both mechanisms increase contribution levels significantly, but only endogenous grouping or the combination of the two increase efficiency significantly.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44 Keywords: Public goods, collective action, group formation, reciprocity JEL Classification: C91, H41, D23 working papers seriesDate posted: June 20, 2002Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.500 seconds